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IN THE SUPHE1·1C COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
15921

SANDERS HANCOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On May 4, 1978, appellant, Sanders Hancock, was
charged by way of an Information with exercising "unauthorized
control over cash in an amount in excess of $1,000.00
belonging to Bill Brown Realty with the intent to deprive
him of the same" in violation of Utah Code Ann.
and 76-6-412

§§

76-6-404

(1953), as amended (R.35).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOlVER COURT

On May 9, 1978, appellant was tried on the above
mentioned charge before a jury in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
J. Robert Bullock, presiding (R.l4-l6).

At the conclusion

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the trial, appellant v12s founc1 guilty of th'' offense
charged (R.l6), and sentenced to not

le~s

than one nor

more than fifteen years in the Utah StJte Prison (R.l2),
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the
lower court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 26, 1978, Bill Brown hired the
appellant, Sanders Hancock, to manage an apartment
building, the Moon River Apartments, owned
by Mr. Brown (T.70).

exclusive~

Appellant's duties were those cl

general management which included the collection of
c."')::.;3it and rent monies and the requirement that the
appellant turn over these monies to Mr. Brown or his
bookkeeper, Billie Brinkerhoff, within 24 hours of
collection (T. 71) •

Within a day or two of the signing

of the employment contract, the appellant occupied an
apartment within the complex and began his duties.
At trial r1r. Brmm testified that the a??ellar·
performed satisfactorily during the month of February,
but during the early part of April his bookkeeper notif
him that the rents were s lmv in coming in

(T. 7 2) .

Nr.

Brown then contacted the appellant and questioned him
about the collection of the rent.

The appellant promio·
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Mr. Brown that he would bring the rent and deposit monies
to him by 10:00 a.m. the next day (T.72).
The next day the appellant failed to appear,
but a friend of appellant's, Sam Ungricht, arrived at
Mr. Brown's office and informed him that the appellant
had taken substantial rent monies and left for Las Vegas
(T. 7 3).

Mr. Brmvn then contacted the Provo City Police

Department and filed a complaint initiating these
proceedings (T.73).

Subsequently, the appellant was

arrested in Las Vegas, the police finding substantial amounts
of cash and a check to the Moon River Apartments on his
person (T.l72).
At trial the State put on evidence which established
that the appellant had told at least ten apartment renters
to make their rent or deposit checks payable to him.
Appellant variously told the renters to make checks
payable to him because (1) he was a co-owner, with Mr.
Brown, of the complex, or (2) Mr. Brown would not accept
out-of-state checks; therefore

necessitating payment to

the appellant who in turn would make out a personal check
to Mr. Brown on behalf of the renters.
The following renters testified at trial as to
th0 payments made by them to the appellant:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ira J. Ghaemi gilve

app~llant

a check

ma~e

payable to appellant on April 4, 1978, for $80.00
for a deposit on one of the apartments

(T.lO).

Hamid-Reza-Jafari gave the appellant a check
for $149.50 on April 8, 1978, made payable to appellant,
for rental of an apartment unit (T.l5).
Steven Van Ausdal gave the appellant $80.00
for a deposit on

~1arch

9, 1978, and $165.00 for rent on

March 22, 1978 (T.l9).
Mohammad Sabbaghi paid appellant $80.00 for
a deposit on a unit and $190.00 for rent on April 6,
l973, both by check (T.23).
Sally Jean Casper gave appellant $80.00 in

ca~

as a deposit on March 25, 1978, and another $100.00
for rent on April l, 1978 (T.28).
Elisha Crandall paid appellant $80.00 by checl
for a deposit on March 21, 1978 (T.32).
Harriet N. Tibbs paid appellant $64.3n, cash,
for rent on April 4, 1978

(T.39).

Lisa Snelders paid $157.61 to appellant for
rent and deposit on March 19, 1978

(T.43).

Sherry Cloward testified that on March 18, 1978,
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she gave the appellant $155.04 for rent (T.50).
Finally, Glen Smith stated that he paid $80.00,
cash, for a deposit on March 25, 1978, and $195.00 for
rent on March 31, 1978, to appellant (T.52,53).
In regard to each of the foregoing witnesses,
the State produced either a cancelled check made payable
to the appellant or a receipt for cash from the appellant.
Mrs. Billie Brinkerhoff, Bill Brown's bookkeeper, testified
that she never received any of the monies referred to
above for deposit or rental of units at the Moon River
Apartments (T.58-67).
Following the introduction of this evidence and
at the conclusion of the appellant's trial, he was found
guilty of the crime charged.

This appeal follows.

ARGUHENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT AT
TRIAL TO THE CHALLENGED JURY INSTRUCTION
NOH PREVENTS HIM FROM CLAIMING ERROR.
By way of this appeal, appellant claims error
was committed by the lower court when it instructed the
jury as to the essential elements of the crime charged.
Appellant claims that the elements of the crime, as
outlined by the court in Instruction No. 6 (R.22), were
not complete in that they did not include the requirement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that the successive thefts rt:>sult<cc1 frorn "one sinqlc
incriminating impulse or intent."
Respondent asserts that the appellant's failure
to timely object to the jury instructions now

pre~ludes

him from raising the supposed error on appeal.

Regarding jury instructions and objections
thereto, Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide,

in pertinent part:
"If the instructions are to be
given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the
instructions are given to the jury;
otherwise, objections may be made
to the instructions after they are
given to the jury, but before the
jury retires to consider its verdict.
No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects
thereto.
In objecting to the giving
of an instruction, a party must state
distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his
objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate
court, in its discretion and in the
interests of justice may review the
giving or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to
make objections, and they shall be
made, out of the hearing of the jury."
Thus, the general rule stated in Rule 51 is
that a party must object at the time the instructions
are offered in order to preserve the error for
consideration on appeal.

Respondent notes that when

asked if he excepted to any part or portion of the
jury
instructions
appellant's
counsel
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would not object to any portion thereof (T.l85).
Although Rule 51 contains a limitation on
the above stated general rule requiring a timely
appeal, this Court has consistently construed the
rule narrowly so as to require a timely objection
to an instruction before it will consider the alleged
error on appeal.

For example, in State v. Logan,

563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), the Court found that the
error claimed by the defendant regarding the jury
instructions was without merit, but stated that even
if it had found otherwise the "appellant still could
not prevail in this case for the record shows that he
failed to object at the time the instructions were
given, and ordinarily the failure to make a timely
objection prohibits him from raising the point on
appeal."

563 P.2d at 813.
The reasoning behind this strict application

of Rule 51 is stated in State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190
(Utah 1976).

The Kazda Court first notes th0 case of

State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), as
providing an exception to Rule 51, but then states,
concerning the general rule and the Cabo exception,
the foll01·1ing:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"There is an important purrosc
to be served by the rule requiring
that objections be made to the
instructions.
It gives an
opportunity for the court to correct,
or to fill in any inadequacy in the
instructions, so that the jury may
consider the case on a proper basis.
In order to accomplish that purpose,
the rule should be adhered to.
Accordingly, the standard rule is
that when a party fails to make a
proper objection to an erroneous
instruction, or to present to the
court a proper request to supply any
claimed deficiency in the instructions,
he is thereafter precluded from
contending error.
The Cabo case
involved a homicide in which tlw
appellate court appeared to be
convinced that an injustice had
resulted. Accordingly, i t noted
such an exception.
But the exception
is applied only rarely where there
appears to be a substantial likelihood
that an injustice has resulted.
Then
and then only will the failure to
comply with the requirements of the
rule be excused. No such circumstance
appears to exist here."
545 P.2d at
194, 195.
Thus, this Court made it clear in Ko7da that a
timely objection is a prerequisite to
of a jury instruction unless appellant

appell~te
contend~;

review
and all

the circumstances exist that substantial injustice has
resulted from the supposed defective jury instructions.
In this matter appellant does not contend nor
does he set forth any facts which tend to show that
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in jus c icc, rcc:oul ted from the <Jiving of the challenged
jury instruction in the trial court.

Because appellant

failed to timely object to the challenged jury instruction
and because no injustice has resulted therefrom,
respondent avers that this Court should give effect
to Rule 51 and a substantial body of case law which
would preclude appellant from raising this question
on appeal.

State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760 (Utah 1977);

State v. Blea, 20 Utah 2d 133, 434 P.2d 446, 25 ALR3d
1113

(1967); State v. Myers, 15 Utah 2d 130, 388 P.2d

801 (1964); State v. Rowley, 15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126
(1963).
POINT II
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO RAISE THE QUESTION
OF THE CONTINUITY OF THE OFFENSE IN THE
TRIAL COURT PRECLUDES HIM FROM RAISING THIS
QUESTION ON APPEAL.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred
when it did not instruct the jury that when a charge
results from a series of takings, in order for the
separate acts to be aggregated into a single offense,
they must all result from "one single incriminating
impulse or intent."
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Respondent again notes, as staled in PGint

r of this brief, that appellant failed to request the
court to instruct the jury as to this issue.
further notes that the appellant at no time

Responde~
durin~

the

course of his trial raised the issue of one continuous
offense or transaction with the charge of grand lareen,·.
The record in this matter does not reveal any objection,
exception or mention by appellant of the issue he now
presses on appeal.

Thus, appellant raises this issue

for the first time on appeal.

For this Court to conside.

appellant's argument on appeal, where he has failed to
raise and preserve it at trial, would contravene the
intent of several previous decisions prohibiting
examination of an issue raised for the first time on
appeal.

Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d

343 (1970); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174,
4 0 6 p. 2d 912 ( 19 6 5) •
A case in point is State v. Allen, 59 N.H. 139,
280 P.2d 298

(1955), where the defendant had been

convicted of one count of theft from the person for
stealing both vodka and cash.

The vodka vias taken

from the victim early in the evening, but the defendant
returned later that night to steal the cash.

The

Supr~

Court of New Mexico concluded that the evidence was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clear as tu whether the acts resulted from a single,
S'lstai_necl, criminal impulse.

It stated that this

was a question for the jury's determination, but held
the defendant's failure to raise the question at the
trial level would preclude the Court from examining the
issue on appeal.

The court, therefore, felt constrained

to affirm the decision of the lower court.

280 P.2d

at 299.
In State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330, 108 Pac. 349
(1910), a defendant was convicted of grand larceny for
embezzling some $235.60 from the Theater Publishing
Company over the course of 38 days.

The statute in

force at the time made an offense grand larceny if the
amount taken exceeded $50.

The largest single sum

embezzled by defendant Gibson was $48.60.

The defendant

requested an instruction to the effect that because the
defendant was not found with more than $50 in his
possession at any one time, only a lesser charge of
petit larceny could be found.

This Court affirmed the

trial court's refusal to give such an instruction,
stating:
"We think no error was committed
in the ruling. The case is not like
that argued to us by appellant where
the successive larcenies, each complete
and distinct, did not constitute one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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continuous transaction; or \vh<'l-c·
propert:ies belonging to different
persons located at different pl~ces
were purloined, and where each
asportation constituted a separate
and distinct offense •.• But it is one
of embezzlement 'committed by a
series of connected transactions
from day to day' ••• and shown to be a
'continuous offense committed by a
trusted servant by means of a series
of connected transactions; and in such
case a charge of embezzlement on a
certain date will cover and admit eviden~
of the whole' ••. and is one constituting
'in fact and in law a single embezzlement'
••• and where 'the one substantive charge
of embezzleme:1t was support.ed by proof
of the receipt at different timc·s of
the amount' the appellant 'was charged
to have embezzled and one convPrsion of
the whole.' (Citation omitted.)"
37
Utah at 332-333.
~he

Gibson Court found no requirement that a series of

acts must result from "one single incriminating impulse
or intent."

Moreover, in State v. McCarthy, 25

Utah~

425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971), this Court again found no
affirmative duty on the part of the trial ccn11·t to
instruct the jury on the "one continuous offense theory.'
In McCarthy, two individuals were a?prehended stealing
hams, one being in possession of nineteen hams, defendan'
McCarthy having only four.

McCarthy was convicted of

attempted grand larceny despite the fact that the fom
hams

would not exceed the statutory $50 requirement.
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In clcio i tion to finding that a lesser included offense
instruction was WQived by a failure to request it,
the Court stQted:
"In the circumstances shown,
despite the defendant's hopeful
conjecture and urgence, we see
no basis upon which it could
reasonably be believed that this
was a segmented transaction in
which there was an attempt to
steal the four hams separately
and thus make the offense petty
larceny." Id. at 891.
Other states have also refused to find an affirmative
duty of the trial court to submit instructions under
similar fact

situations.

See, e.g., Brown v. State,

30 Ala.App. 27, 200 So. 630, cert. den. 200 So. 634 (1941);
McKnight v. State, 134 Tex.Crim.Rep. 373, 115 S.W.2d
636 (1938); State v. Martin, 82 U.C. 672 (1880).

See,

generally, 136 ALR 949, 53 ALR3d 398.
Respondent submits that the finding of this
Court in McCarthy, supra, should be controlling in the
instant case.

There is no reasonable basis suggesting

appellant's actions were segmented.

All monies were

enbezzled from the same employer, all were generated from
the same apartment complex, and the entire embezzlement
occurred within a short period of time.

Therefore,
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there was no reasonable basis for

Clil

ins true tion uncl.2 r

the facts presented.
CONCLUSION
Appellant failed to raise his theory of a
"single, sustained, criminal impuse" at trial.
Respondent had no opportunity to address the issue
or put on evidence establishing such an impulse.
Furthermore, the trial court had no opportunity to
rule on the merits of such a defense.
Appellant also failed to object to the court's
instructions to the jury regarding the elements of the
crime.

Appellant clearly stated that he had no

objections to the instructions given by the trial court.
Respondent asserts that to allow the

appella~

to raise this issue for full review by this Court on
would be contrary to all notions of fairness,
economy and appellate procedure.

judicial

Additionally, such

consideration would be contrary to substantial
authorities.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney Cenerc-tl
CRJ\IG L. BARLOIJ
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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